COUNCIL MEETING - 17 DECEMBER 2019

TREASURY MANAGEMENT 2019-20 MID YEAR REPORT

1. Purpose of Report

1.1. This report provides an update on the Council's treasury activity and prudential indicators for the first half of 2019/20.

2. Summary of Treasury Balances as at 30 September 2019

2.1. Below is a summary of the Councils borrowing position as at 30 September 2019, further information at section 6.

	Balance on 30/09/2019 £m
Total Borrowings	**95.243**
Total Other Long Term Liabilities	**0.224**
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT	**95.467**

2.2. Below is a summary of the Councils investment position as at 30 September 2019, further information at section 7.

	Balance on 30/09/2019 £m
Total Short term Investments	**39.947**
Total Long term Investments	**4.000**
TOTAL INVESTMENTS	**43.947**

2.3. Below is a summary of the Councils capital expenditure position as at 30 September 2019, further breakdown at section 5.

Capital Expenditure	**2019/20 Initial Capital Budget £m**	**Current Expenditure 30/09/2019 £m**	**2019/20 Revised Estimate £m**
General Fund Expenditure	15.048	6.567	15.696
HRA Expenditure	16.439	8.252	17.173
Total Capital Expenditure	**31.487**	**14.819**	**32.869**

2.4. **Breach of Indicator**, the Council can confirm one indicator was breached during the first half of 2019/20, the limit on the Council's monies left in their bank account was breached for one day, full details at section 9.1.

3. Introduction

3.1. This report has been written in accordance with the requirements of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management (revised 2017). The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:

- Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
- Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
- Receipt by the full council of an annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement - including the Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy - for

the year ahead, a Mid-year Review Report and an Annual Report, (stewardship report), covering activities during the previous year.

- Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
- Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is the Audit and Accounts Committee.

3.2. This mid-year report has been prepared in compliance with CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management, and covers the following:

- An economic update for the first part of the 2019/20 financial year;
- A review of the Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy;
- The Council's capital expenditure, as set out in the Capital Strategy, and prudential indicators;
- A review of the Council's investment portfolio for 2019/20;
- A review of the Council's borrowing strategy for 2019/20;
- A review of any debt rescheduling undertaken during 2019/20;
- A review of compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits for 2019/20.

3.3. Treasury Management is defined as: "The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks".

3.4. The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure the Council can meet its capital spending operations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses, and on occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

4. Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) and Annual Investment Strategy update

4.1. The Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2019/20 was approved by Full Council on 7 March 2019. There are no policy changes to the TMSS; the details in this report update the position in the light of the updated economic position and budgetary changes already approved.

5. The Council's Capital Position

This part of the report is structured to update:

- The Council's capital expenditure plans;
- How these plans are being financed;
- The impact of the changes in the capital expenditure plans on the prudential indicators and the underlying need to borrow; and
- Compliance with the limits in place for borrowing activity.

5.1. The table below shows the revised estimates for capital expenditure and the changes since the Capital Programme was agreed within the Capital Programme budget on 7 March 2019.

Capital Expenditure	2019/20 Capital Budget approved 7 March 2019 £m	Current Expenditure £m	2019/20 Revised Estimate £m
General Fund Expenditure	15.048	6.567	15.696
HRA Expenditure	16.439	8.252	17.173
Total Capital Expenditure	**31.487**	**14.819**	**32.869**
Financed by:			
Capital Receipts	5.787		5.547
Capital Grants	5.366		7.209
Capital Reserves	8.507		9.167
Revenue	6.930		5.047
Total Financing	**26.590**		**26.970**
Borrowing Requirement	**4.897**		**5.899**

The financing of the Capital Programme will be determined by the S151 Officer at the year-end based on best use of resources.

The increase from the Budget approved 7 March 2019 relates to approved capital carry forward requests and approved variations to the capital programme.

5.2. The Council has an increasing CFR over the next 2 years due to the Capital Programme and there may be a requirement to borrow up to £18.2m over the forecast period. However, if reserve levels permit, internal borrowing will be considered.

6. Borrowing Strategy

6.1. At 30 September 2019 the Council held £95m of loans, as part of its strategy for funding previous years' capital programmes.

6.2. **Borrowing Activity in 2019/20**

	General Fund		HRA	
	Balance on 01/04/2019 £m	**Balance on 30/09/2019 £m**	**Balance on 01/04/2019 £m**	**Balance on 30/09/2019 £m**
Short Term Borrowing	4.983	5.174	2.000	2.000
Long Term Borrowing	0	0	88.080	88.068
TOTAL BORROWING	**4.983**	**5.174**	**90.080**	**90.068**
Other Long Term Liabilities	0.224	0.224	0	0
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT	**5.207**	**5.398**	**90.080**	**90.068**
CFR	26.632	24.815	105.983	105.006
Under / (over) borrowing	21.425	19.417	15.903	14.938

6.3. As the Council is in a significant under borrowed position, as per the table in 6.2, there may be a requirement during the remainder of the financial year where new borrowing is required. Any new borrowing will be within the approved Treasury Management Borrowing Strategy framework and will have been reviewed by the S151 Officer for cost effectiveness as whether to borrow shorter term or long term in relation to interest rate forecasts.

6.4. **PWLB Increase Update**: On 9 October 2019 the Treasury and PWLB announced an increase in the margin over gilt yields of 100bps on top of the current margin of 80 bps which the Council has paid prior to this date for new borrowing from the PWLB. There was no prior warning that this would happen and it now means that every local authority has to fundamentally reassess how to finance their external borrowing needs and the financial viability of capital projects in their capital programme due to this unexpected increase in the cost of borrowing. Representations are going to be made to HM Treasury to suggest that areas of capital expenditure that the Government are keen to see move forward e.g. housing, should not be subject to such a large increase in borrowing.

6.5. **LOBOs**: The Council holds £3.5m of LOBO (Lender's Option Borrower's Option) loans where the lender has the option to propose an increase in the interest rate at set dates, following which the Council has the option to either accept the new rate or to repay the loan at no additional cost. All of the £3.5m of LOBOS had options during the last 6 months, none of which were exercised by the lender. The Council acknowledges there is an element of refinancing risk even though in the current interest rate environment lenders are unlikely to exercise their options.

6.6. **Internal borrowing*:*** For the Council, the use of internal resources in lieu of borrowing has continued to be the most cost effective means of funding of capital expenditure that has not been funded from grants and other resources. This has lowered overall treasury risk by reducing both external debt and temporary investments. However this position will not be sustainable over the medium term as the Council needs to use reserves for the purpose they were set aside for, and external borrowing may need to be undertaken.

6.7. **Debt rescheduling*:*** The premium charge for early repayment of PWLB debt remains relatively expensive for the loans in the Council's portfolio and therefore unattractive for debt rescheduling activity. No rescheduling activity was undertaken or is proposed during the rest of the financial year as a consequence.

7. Investment Activity

7.1. The Guidance on Local Government Investments in England gives priority to security and liquidity and the Council's aim is to achieve a return commensurate with these principles.

7.2. **Investment Activity in 2019/20**

Type of Investment	**Balance on 01/04/2019 £m**	**Balance on 30/09/2019 £m**	**Average Interest Rate**
Short term Investments			
Fixed Term Deposits:			
Santander	5.000	5.000	0.40%

Lloyds 95 Day Notice	4.900	4.900	0.95%
Money Market Funds:			
Goldman Sachs	9.789	9.684	0.69%
Deutsche Bank	1.545	2.344	0.66%
Invesco	10.000	9.978	0.74%
CCLA	10.000	6.000	0.78%
Bank Call Account:			
Handelsbanken	0.136	2.041	0.50%
Total Short Term Investments	**41.370**	**39.947**	
Long term Investments	0	0	
CCLA Property Fund	0	2.000	4.00%
CCLA Diversified Income Fund	0	2.000	3.00%
Total Long Term Investments	**0**	**4.000**	
TOTAL INVESTMENTS	**41.370**	**43.947**	
Increase/ (Decrease) in Investments		2.577	

7.3. Both the CIPFA Code and government guidance require the Council to invest its funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its treasury investments before seeking the optimum rate of return, or yield. The Council's objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income.

7.4. The Council's budgeted investment return for 2019/20 is £0.369m, and performance for the year to date is in line with the budget.

8. Non-Treasury Investments

8.1. The definition of investments in CIPFA's revised Treasury Management Code now covers all the financial assets of the Council as well as other non-financial assets which the Council holds primarily for financial return or regeneration purposes. This is replicated in MHCLG's Investment Guidance, in which the definition of investments is further broadened to also include all such assets held partially for financial return or regeneration purposes.

8.2. Breakdown below of current Non-Treasury Investments held;

Counterparty	**Balance at 30/09/2019**
Growth Investment Fund	£419,222
Loans to Housing Associations	£21,108
Loans to Parish Councils	£17,322

These investments are due to generate £0.015m of investment income for the Council after taking account of direct costs, representing a rate of return of 5.22%.

9. Prudential Indicators

Breach of Indicators

9.1. The Council can confirm that the set limit of monies to be left in the Councils bank account is £0.500m, however on 1 August 2019 this limited was breached for one day. This was due to staff holidays and the switching of staffing roles which resulted in there only being one available authoriser, whereas for payments over £0.050m two authorisers are required. The following day there was a large payment for housing benefits which brought the balance back below the limit. The rest of Prudential Indicators for 2019/20, which was set on 7 March 2019 as part of the Council's Treasury Management Strategy Statement, have been complied with.

Limit To Borrowing Activity

9.2. **Authorised Limit and Operational Boundary for External Debt.** The Local Government Act 2003 requires the Council to set an Affordable Borrowing Limit, irrespective of their indebted status. This is a statutory limit which should not be breached. The Operational Boundary is based on the same estimates as the Authorised Limit but reflects the most likely, prudent but not worst case scenario without the additional headroom included within the Authorised Limit. The s151 Officer confirms that there were no breaches to the Authorised Limit and the Operational Boundary during 2019/20.

	Approved Operational Boundary 2019/20 £m	**Authorised Limit 2019/20 £m**	**Actual External Debt 30/09/2019 £m**	**Compliance**
Borrowing	137.6	142.6	95.2	Yes
Other Long Term Liabilities	0.4	0.6	0.2	Yes
Total	**138.0**	**143.2**	**95.4**	**Yes**

9.3. **Maturity Structure of Fixed Rate Borrowing.** This indicator is to limit large concentrations of fixed rate debt needing to be replaced at times of uncertainty over interest rates.

9.4.

	Upper Limit %	**Actual at 30/09/2019 £**	**Actual at 30/09/2019 %**	**Compliance**
Under 12 months	15%	£2.0m	2.2%	Yes
12-24 months	15%	£4.0m	4.4%	Yes
2-5 years	30%	£16.0m	17.7%	Yes
5-10 years	100%	£25.1m	27.9%	Yes
Over 10 years	100%	£43.0m	47.8%	Yes

Limits to Investing Activity

9.5. **Security.** The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to credit risk by monitoring the value-weighted average credit rating of its investment portfolio. This is calculated by applying a score to each investment (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) and taking the arithmetic average, weighted by the size of each investment. Unrated investments are assigned a score based on their perceived risk.

Credit risk indicator	Target	Actual	Compliance
Portfolio average credit rating	A	AA	Yes

9.6. **Liquidity Risk Indicator**. The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to liquidity risk by monitoring the amount of cash available to meet unexpected payments within a banding period, without additional borrowing.

Total cash available within;	Limit	Actual 30/09/2019	Compliance
3 months	100%	68%	Yes
3 – 12 months	80%	23%	Yes
Over 12 months	40%	9%	Yes

9.7. **Principal Sums Invested for over 364 Days.** The purpose of this indicator is to control the Council's exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments

	Price Risk Limit 2019/20	Actual Investment 30/09/2019	Compliance
Limit on principal invested beyond year end	£10m	£4m	Yes

Limits to Capital Activity

9.8. **Capital Financing Requirement.** The table below shows the CFR, which is the underlying external need to incur borrowing for a capital purpose.

	2019/20 Original Estimate £m	2019/20 Revised Estimate £m
CFR – non housing	26.632	24.815
CFR – housing	105.983	105.006
Total CFR	**132.615**	**129.821**
Net movement in CFR		**-2.794**

9.9. **Capital Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream.** Although capital expenditure is not charged directly to the revenue budget, interest payable on loans and MRP are charged to revenue, offset by any investment income receivable. The net annual charge is known as financing costs; this is compared to the net revenue stream i.e. the amount funded from Council Tax, business rates and general government grants.

	2019/20 Original Estimate £m	**2019/20 Revised Estimate £m**
General Fund		
Financing Costs	-0.047	-0.106
Proportion of net revenue stream	-0.33%	-0.81%
Housing Revenue Account		
Financing Costs	11,758	11,758
Proportion of net rental stream	51.37%	51.37%

10. <u>Economic Background/Interest Rate Forecast</u>

10.1. **Appendix A and Appendix B** gives a summarised outlook for the economic background and interest rate forecast from our Treasury Consultants, Link.

11. <u>RECOMMENDATIONS</u> that:-

(a) the treasury management activity be noted; and

(b) the Prudential Indicators detailed in Section 9 of the report be noted.

<u>Background Papers</u>

Nil.

For further information please contact Andrew Snape, Assistant Business Manager – Financial Services on extension 5523.

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APPENDIX A

Economics Update

UK. This first half year has been a time of upheaval on the political front as Theresa May resigned as Prime Minister to be replaced by Boris Johnson on a platform of the UK leaving the EU on or 31 October, with or without a deal. However, in September, his proroguing of Parliament was overturned by the Supreme Court and Parliament carried a bill to delay Brexit until 31 January 2020 if there is no deal by 31 October. MPs also voted down holding a general election before 31 October, though one is likely before the end of 2019. So far, there has been no majority of MPs for any one option to move forward on enabling Brexit to be implemented. At the time of writing the whole Brexit situation is highly fluid and could change radically by the day. Given these circumstances and the likelihood of an imminent general election, any interest rate forecasts are subject to material change as the situation evolves. If the UK does soon achieve a deal on Brexit agreed with the EU then it is possible that growth could recover relatively quickly. The MPC could then need to address the issue of whether to raise Bank Rate at some point in the coming year when there is little slack left in the labour market; this could cause wage inflation to accelerate which would then feed through into general inflation. On the other hand, if there was a no deal Brexit and there was a significant level of disruption to the economy, then growth could weaken even further than currently and the MPC would be likely to cut Bank Rate in order to support growth. However, with Bank Rate still only at 0.75%, it has relatively little room to make a big impact and the MPC would probably suggest that it would be up to the Chancellor to provide help to support growth by way of a fiscal boost by e.g. tax cuts, increases in the annual expenditure budgets of government departments and services and expenditure on infrastructure projects, to boost the economy.

The first half of 2019/20 has seen UK **economic growth** fall as Brexit uncertainty took a toll. In its Inflation Report of 1 August, the Bank of England was notably downbeat about the outlook for both the UK and major world economies. The MPC meeting of 19 September reemphasised their concern about the downturn in world growth and also expressed concern that prolonged Brexit uncertainty would contribute to a build-up of spare capacity in the UK economy, especially in the context of a downturn in world growth. This mirrored investor concerns around the world which are now expecting a significant downturn or possibly even a recession in some major developed economies. It was therefore no surprise that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.75% throughout 2019, so far, and is expected to hold off on changes until there is some clarity on what is going to happen over Brexit. However, it is also worth noting that the new Prime Minister is making some significant promises on various spending commitments and a relaxation in the austerity programme. This will provide some support to the economy and, conversely, take some pressure off the MPC to cut Bank Rate to support growth.

As for **inflation** itself, CPI has been hovering around the Bank of England's target of 2% during 2019, but fell to 1.7% in August. It is likely to remain close to 2% over the next two years and so it does not pose any immediate concern to the MPC at the current time. However, if there was a no deal Brexit, inflation could rise towards 4%, primarily as a result of imported inflation on the back of a weakening pound.

With regard to the **labour market,** despite the contraction in quarterly GDP growth of -0.2% q/q, (+1.3% y/y), in quarter 2, employment continued to rise, but at only a muted rate of 31,000 in the three months to July after having risen by no less than 115,000 in quarter 2 itself: the latter figure, in particular, suggests that firms are preparing to expand output and suggests there could be a return to positive growth in quarter 3. Unemployment continued at a 44 year low of 3.8% on the Independent Labour Organisation measure in July and the participation rate of 76.1% achieved a new all-time high. Job vacancies fell for a seventh consecutive month after having previously hit record levels. However, with unemployment continuing to fall, this month by 11,000, employers will still be having difficulty filling job vacancies with suitable staff. It was therefore unsurprising that wage inflation picked up to a high point of 3.9% in June before easing back slightly to 3.8% in July, (3 month average regular pay, excluding bonuses). This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates higher than CPI inflation), earnings grew by about 2.1%. As the UK economy is very much services sector driven, an increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months. The latest GDP statistics also included a revision of the savings ratio from 4.1% to 6.4% which provides reassurance that consumers' balance sheets are not over stretched and so will be able to support growth going forward. This would then mean that the MPC will need to consider carefully at what point to take action to raise Bank Rate if there is an agreed Brexit deal, as the recent pick-up in wage costs is consistent with a rise in core services inflation to more than 4% in 2020.

In the **political arena**, if there is a general election soon, this could result in a potential loosening of monetary policy and therefore medium to longer dated gilt yields could rise on the expectation of a weak pound and concerns around inflation picking up although, conversely, a weak international backdrop could provide further support for low yielding government bonds and gilts.

USA. President Trump's massive easing of fiscal policy in 2018 fuelled a temporary boost in consumption in that year which generated an upturn in the rate of strong growth to 2.9% y/y. Growth in 2019 has been falling back after a strong start in quarter 1 at 3.1%, (annualised rate), to 2.0% in quarter 2. Quarter 3 is expected to fall further. The strong growth in employment numbers during 2018 has reversed into a falling trend during 2019, indicating that the economy is cooling, while inflationary pressures are also weakening The Fed finished its series of increases in rates to 2.25 – 2.50% in December 2018. In July 2019, it cut rates by 0.25% as a 'midterm adjustment' but flagged up that this was not to be seen as the start of a series of cuts to ward off a downturn in growth. It also ended its programme of quantitative tightening in August, (reducing its holdings of treasuries etc). It then cut rates again in September to 1.75% - 2.00% and is thought likely to cut another 25 bps in December. Investor confidence has been badly rattled by the progressive ramping up of increases in tariffs President Trump has made on Chinese imports and China has responded with increases in tariffs on American imports. This trade war is seen as depressing US, Chinese and world growth. In the EU, it is also particularly impacting Germany as exports of goods and services are equivalent to 46% of total GDP. It will also impact developing countries dependent on exporting commodities to China.

EUROZONE. Growth has been slowing from +1.8 % during 2018 to around half of that in 2019. Growth was +0.4% q/q (+1.2% y/y) in quarter 1 and then fell to +0.2% q/q (+1.0% y/y) in quarter 2; there appears to be little upside potential to the growth rate in the rest of 2019. German GDP growth fell to -0.1% in quarter 2; industrial production was down 4% y/y in June with car production down 10% y/y. Germany would be particularly vulnerable to a no deal Brexit depressing exports further and if President Trump imposes tariffs on EU produced cars. The European Central Bank (ECB) ended its programme of quantitative easing purchases of debt in December 2018, which meant that the central banks in the US, UK and EU had all ended the phase of post financial crisis expansion of liquidity supporting world financial markets by purchases of debt. However, the downturn in EZ growth in the second half of 2018 and into 2019, together with inflation falling well under the upper limit of its target range of 0 to 2%, (but it aims to keep it near to 2%), has prompted the ECB to take new measures to stimulate growth. At its March meeting it said that it expected to leave interest rates at their present levels "at least through the end of 2019", but that was of little help to boosting growth in the near term. Consequently, it announced a third round of TLTROs; this provides banks with cheap borrowing every three months from September 2019 until March 2021 which means that, although they will have only a two-year maturity, the Bank is making funds available until 2023, two years later than under its previous policy. As with the last round, the new TLTROs will include an incentive to encourage bank lending, and they will be capped at 30% of a bank's eligible loans. However, since then, the downturn in EZ and world growth has gathered momentum so at its meeting on 12 September, it cut its deposit rate further into negative territory, from -0.4% to -0.5%, and announced a resumption of quantitative easing purchases of debt. It also increased the maturity of the third round of TLTROs from two to three years. However, it is doubtful whether this loosening of monetary policy will have much impact on growth and unsurprisingly, the ECB stated that governments will need to help stimulate growth by fiscal policy. On the political front, Austria, Spain and Italy are in the throes of forming coalition governments with some unlikely combinations of parties i.e. this raises questions around their likely endurance. The recent results of two German state elections will put further pressure on the frail German CDU/SDP coalition government.

CHINA. Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems. Progress also still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and to switch investment from property construction and infrastructure to consumer goods production. The trade war with the US does not appear currently to have had a significant effect on GDP growth as some of the impact of tariffs has been offset by falls in the exchange rate and by transhipping exports through other countries, rather than directly to the US.

JAPAN - has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

WORLD GROWTH. The trade war between the US and China is a major concern to financial markets and is depressing worldwide growth, as any downturn in China will spill over into impacting countries supplying raw materials to China. Concerns are focused on the synchronised general weakening of growth in the major economies of the world compounded by fears that there could even be a recession looming up in the US, though this is probably overblown. These concerns have resulted in government bond yields in the developed world falling significantly during 2019. If there were a major worldwide downturn in growth, central banks in most of the major economies will have limited ammunition available, in terms of monetary policy measures, when rates are already very low in most countries, (apart from the US), and there are concerns about how much distortion of financial markets has already occurred with the current levels of quantitative easing purchases of debt by central banks. The latest PMI survey statistics of economic health for the US, UK, EU and China have all been sub 50 which gives a forward indication of a downturn in growth; this confirms investor sentiment that the outlook for growth during the rest of this financial year is weak.

APPENDIX B

Interest Rate Forecasts

The Council's treasury advisor, Link Asset Services, has provided the following forecast.
This forecast includes the increase in margin over gilt yields of 100bps introduced on 9.10.19.

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22
Bank Rate View	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
3 Month LIBID	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.20
6 Month LIBID	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.40
12 Month LIBID	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.50	1.60
5yr PWLB Rate	2.30	2.50	2.60	2.70	2.70	2.80	2.90	3.00	3.00	3.10
10yr PWLB Rate	2.60	2.80	2.90	3.00	3.00	3.10	3.20	3.30	3.30	3.40
25yr PWLB Rate	3.30	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.70	3.70	3.80	3.90	4.00	4.00
50yr PWLB Rate	3.20	3.30	3.40	3.50	3.60	3.60	3.70	3.80	3.90	3.90

The above forecasts have been based on an assumption that there is some sort of muddle through to an agreed deal on Brexit at some point in time. Given the current level of uncertainties, this is a huge assumption and so forecasts may need to be materially reassessed in the light of events over the next few weeks or months.

It has been little surprise that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.75% so far in 2019 due to the ongoing uncertainty over Brexit. In its meeting on 1 August, the MPC became more dovish as it was more concerned about the outlook for both the global and domestic economies. That is shown in the policy statement, based on an assumption that there is an agreed deal on Brexit, where the suggestion that rates would need to rise at a "gradual pace and to a limited extent" is now also conditional on "some recovery in global growth". Brexit uncertainty has had a dampening effect on UK GDP growth in 2019, especially around mid-year. If there were a no deal Brexit, then it is likely that there will be a cut or cuts in Bank Rate to help support economic growth. The September MPC meeting sounded even more concern about world growth and the effect that prolonged Brexit uncertainty is likely to have on growth.

Bond yields / PWLB rates. There has been much speculation recently that we are currently in a bond market bubble. However, given the context that there are heightened expectations that the US could be heading for a recession, and a general background of a downturn in world economic growth, together with inflation generally at low levels in most countries and expected to remain subdued, conditions are ripe for low bond yields. While inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last thirty years in lowering inflation expectations, the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers: this means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc. This has pulled down the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets over the last thirty years. We have therefore seen over the last year, many bond yields up to ten years in the Eurozone actually turn negative. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby ten year yields have fallen below shorter term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession. The other side of this coin is that bond prices are elevated as investors would be expected to be moving out of riskier assets i.e. shares, in anticipation of a downturn in corporate earnings and so selling out of equities. However, stock markets are also currently at high levels as some investors have focused on chasing returns in the context of dismal ultra-low interest rates on cash deposits.

What we saw during the last half year up to 30 September is a near halving of longer term PWLB rates to completely unprecedented historic low levels. *(See paragraph 7 for comments on the increase in margin over gilt yields of 100bps introduced on 9.10.19.)* There is though, an expectation that financial markets have gone too far in their fears about the degree of the downturn in US and world growth. If, as expected, the US only suffers a mild downturn in growth, bond markets in the US are likely to sell off and that would be expected to put upward pressure on bond yields, not only in the US, but due to a correlation between US treasuries and UK gilts, which at various times has been strong but at other times weaker, in the UK. However, forecasting the timing of this and how strong the correlation is likely to be, is very difficult to forecast with any degree of confidence.

One potential danger that may be lurking in investor minds is that Japan has become mired in a twenty year bog of failing to get economic growth and inflation up off the floor, despite a combination of massive monetary and fiscal stimulus by both the central bank and government. Investors could be fretting that this condition might become contagious.

Another danger is that unconventional monetary policy post 2008, (ultra-low interest rates plus quantitative easing), may end up doing more harm than good through prolonged use. Low interest rates have encouraged a debt fuelled boom which now makes it harder for economies to raise interest rates. Negative interest rates could damage the profitability of commercial banks and so impair their ability to lend and / or push them into riskier lending. Banks could also end up holding large amounts of their government's bonds and so create a potential doom loop. (A doom loop would occur where the credit rating of the debt of a nation was downgraded which would cause bond prices to fall, causing losses on debt portfolios held by banks and insurers, so reducing their capital and forcing them to sell bonds – which, in turn, would cause further falls in their prices etc.). In addition, the financial viability of pension funds could be damaged by low yields on holdings of bonds.

The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably to the downside due to the weight of all the uncertainties over Brexit, as well as a softening global economic picture.
- The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates are broadly similarly to the downside.

One risk that is both an upside and downside risk is that all central banks are now working in very different economic conditions than before the 2008 financial crash. There has been a major increase in consumer and other debt due to the exceptionally low levels of borrowing rates that have prevailed for eleven years since 2008. This means that the neutral rate of interest in an economy, (i.e. the rate that is neither expansionary nor deflationary), is difficult to determine definitively in this new environment, although central banks have made statements that they expect it to be much lower than before 2008. Central banks could, therefore, over or under-do increases in central interest rates.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **Brexit** – if it were to cause significant economic disruption and a major downturn in the rate of growth.
- **Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.** In 2018, Italy was a major concern due to having a populist coalition government which made a lot of anti-austerity and anti-EU noise. However, in September 2019 there was a major change in the coalition governing Italy which has brought to power a much more EU friendly government; this has eased the pressure on Italian bonds. Only time will tell whether this new unlikely alliance of two very different parties will endure.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, particularly Italian banks.

- **German minority government.** In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. Then in October 2018, the results of the Bavarian and Hesse state elections radically undermined the SPD party and showed a sharp fall in support for the CDU. As a result, the SPD had a major internal debate as to whether it could continue to support a coalition that is so damaging to its electoral popularity. After the result of the Hesse state election, Angela Merkel announced that she would not stand for re-election as CDU party leader at her party's convention in December 2018. However, this makes little practical difference as she has continued as Chancellor, though more recently concerns have arisen over her health.
- **Other minority EU governments.** Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands and Belgium all have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
- **Italy, Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU. There has also been rising anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- There are concerns around the level of **US corporate debt** which has swollen massively during the period of low borrowing rates in order to finance mergers and acquisitions. This has resulted in the debt of many large corporations being downgraded to a BBB credit rating, close to junk status. Indeed, 48% of total investment grade corporate debt is rated at BBB. If such corporations fail to generate profits and cash flow to reduce their debt levels as expected, this could tip their debt into junk ratings which will increase their cost of financing and further negatively impact profits and cash flow.
- **Geopolitical risks,** for example in North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates

- **Brexit** – if agreement was reached all round that removed all threats of economic and political disruption between the EU and the UK.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- **UK inflation,** whether domestically generated or imported, returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.